Women and Justice: Court: Supreme Court of Liberia

The appellants were charged with the murder of a 13-year-old girl. The Supreme Court was asked to consider whether the prosecutor proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The victim was found hanging by rope in the appellants’ bathroom and died the same day in the hospital. The appellants brought the victim to the hospital prior to her death. Evidence showed that she had bruises on the left and right side of her neck, and she had sexual intercourse prior to her death. The grand jury indicted the appellants in the circuit Court. The Judge granted the appellants’ motion for bail. In the trial, the appellants produced multiple witnesses to testify that they were in the same house when the incident occurred. The prosecutors had two autopsy reports proving that the victim’s death was caused by sexual abuse or homicide. The Circuit Judge convicted the appellants for murder and sentenced them to death by hanging. The appellants filed a petition for the writ of certiorari for a crime not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held that in the case of murder, the prosecutors are required to overcome the presumption of innocence. Here, the government failed to establish each element of the crime of murder, specifically, the government failed to prove that each of the appellants choked the victim to death, failed to prove that each of the appellants hanged her body in the bathroom in their house, and failed to prove the missing belt, which was used to tie the victim belonged to the appellants. The Supreme Court also explained that the government failed to produce the DNA specimens from the victim to test after taking the appellants’ DNA for testing, and could not produce any evidence that linked the hanging to the appellants. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment for the lower court to reconsider.

Korkoya v. Korkoya Supreme Court of Liberia ( 1994 )

The Domestic Relations Law provides that the grounds for divorce are (1) inhuman treatment by the defendant-spouse that causes danger to the plaintiff-spouse’s physical and mental well-being, (2) desertion of the plaintiff-spouse by the defendant-spouse for a period of one or more years, (3) the defendant-spouse commits adultery, or (4) incompatibility of temper that results in danger to the plaintiff-spouse. The appellant husband filed for divorce for incompatibility of temperament. In the complaint, the husband alleged that his wife was quarrelsome and pugnacious, which the wife denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial. A final judgment was rendered confirming the original verdict. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court and contended that a new trial should be awarded. The Supreme Court recited some of the testimony from the trial. In the trial, the defendant testified that the appellant had an intimate relationship with a third person and did not leave any food for the family. The Supreme Court stated that if the complaining spouse who filed for divorce was not responsible for the “incompatibility,” the trial court should grant the divorce. However, if the incompatibility arose from the misconduct of the complaining spouse, the trial court had the discretion to deny the divorce. The Supreme Court found the complaint by the appellant defective and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Barclay v. Digen Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2011 )

The appellant filed a complaint to divorce her husband and an action of summary proceedings to recover her property from the appellee. The appellee-husband claimed he was entitled to a property acquired during the marriage because a married woman cannot acquire property in her own name solely for herself. The Court held that, under the 1986 Constitution, (a) there is no legal significance of a woman choosing to use her husband’s surname; it does not affect the right of a woman to own property while married; (b) a woman can purchase property in her maiden name during marriage; (c) unless freely consented to, property which is owned solely by a husband’s wife cannot be controlled by her spouse. The Court ruled that the appellant proved her title to the property by a preponderance of evidence. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the verdict and directed the lower court to enter judgment to evict the appellee.

Toopah v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia ( 1974 )

The defendant appealed a homicide conviction for the shooting of his wife, arguing that the killing resulted from his discovery of her adultery and could, therefore, only amount to manslaughter. In a charge of homicide, the law requires a showing of malice (i.e., a murder committed with premeditation). Implied malice (i.e., murder committed in the “heat of passion;” without premeditation) is nullified by sufficient provocation. The court found that his contention of provocation was unsupported and that his testimony was contradicted by witnesses’ testimony, which indicated that he routinely beat his wife and threatened her life. On the day of the shooting, he took the rifle home without permission and he called his wife to return home prior to shooting her. No evidence showed that his wife was committing adultery. Thus, the Court upheld the conviction, refusing to consider provocation as a mitigating circumstance and finding that the murder was premeditated because the evidence proved express malice.

Tequah v. Paye Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2014 )

The three appellants were accused and convicted of armed robbery and gang rape. The trial court found that the appellants raped the victim at gun point. The Supreme Court of Liberia upheld that under circumstances of violence or threats of violence to have sexual intercourse with a person, there is a presumption that the person being violated or threatened did not consent. In such circumstances, the burden of proving affirmative consent from the victim is on the accused.

Gardea v. R. Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2014 )

The Appellant was convicted of raping his step-daughter on three occasions and sentenced to life imprisonment. He appealed the decision on the basis of lack of evidence. The prosecution’s case relied on evidence provided by the victim (deceased at the time of the trial), her nine-year-old sister, and a medical professional who examined the victim at the hospital immediately after she was raped. The defence argued that evidence provided by the victim immediately before her death was hearsay. The court held that, while under Liberian law hearsay cannot form the basis of a criminal conviction, “a dying declaration” (i.e., when a victim provides evidence concerning her or his attacker whilst at impending death in extremis) can be admitted as evidence and is not hearsay. The court also pointed out that, despite her young age, the victim’s sister’s evidence, which was admitted, was not hearsay because she was a direct witness to the attack and was subject to comprehensive cross examination. Finally, the court rejected the defence’s claims that the medical professional who inspected the victim in the hospital was not an expert witness because of her credentials that included a medical degree and over ten years of experience treating children victims of sexual violence. The conviction was upheld.

Clark v. Clinton-Johnson Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2015 )

The Act Creating Criminal Court E, Section 25.3(a), requires magistrates to forward a case alleging a sexual offense to the circuit court within 72 hours of arrest without first investigating the charge. However, the Constitution of Liberia, Article 21(f), requires courts in general criminal matters to conduct an investigation, known as a preliminary examination, within 48 hours to determine whether a prima facia case exists, thereby prohibiting preventively detaining the accused. The petitioner was arrested for rape, and the magistrate forwarded the case to the circuit court without first conducting a preliminary examination. The Supreme Court of Liberia held that forwarding such a case to the circuit court under the Act does not violate the Constitution, notwithstanding the additional time and its potential characterization as preventive detention, because magistrate courts are not equipped to protect witnesses from public exposure and the psychological harm resulting from directly facing the defendant. The objective of promoting witness protection having outweighed the additional time required by forwarding such cases to the circuit court, the Constitution is not violated, and Section 25.3(a) stands.

Dlyon v. Lambert, et al. Supreme Court of Liberia ( 1884 )

This early case established the precedent that a married woman may own and convey property independent of her husband. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision denying ownership of a half-acre of land. Ms. Dlyon bought the property from a sheriff’s auction after it was repossessed for the payment of the owner’s debts. The Lamberts argued both that the previous possessor of the land never gained title of the property because he failed to obtain a fee simple deed so could not be used to pay his debts, and that even if he did have title, a married woman could not purchase land. On the first point, the court held that while the previous possessor did not have perfect title to the land, it could still be reached by creditors. On the second point, the court unambiguously declared that Ms. Dlyon had the right to purchase the property: “Under the Constitution, a femme couverte [married woman] may convey property she is possessed of otherwise than through her husband and this fact admits the inference that she may also bargain and buy property independent of her husband.”

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape and reduced his sentence from life imprisonment to 50 years imprisonment. The victim, an 11-year-old girl, stated that the appellant, 38, forced her into his room and had nonconsensual sexual intercourse with her. The court affirmed the lower court’s admission in evidence of the testimony of the victim’s mother, who testified that she saw blood on the victim’s skirt and questioned the victim about the incident. The court held that the testimony qualified as an exception to the hearsay rule because statements are generally admissible “to determine the trustworthiness and reliability of statements made by child victims of abuse.” In addition, the court affirmed the lower court’s admission in evidence of the expert testimony of a physician’s assistant. The court held that even though the physician’s assistant did not have a medical degree, he qualified as an expert because of his experience with and knowledge of victims of sexual violence. The court noted that social workers trained in these areas would qualify as expert witnesses.

Fallah v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2011 )

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that appellant, Musa Solomon Fallah, was guilty of rape and upheld his sentence of life imprisonment. The appellant had been convicted previously, but the Supreme Court vacated that conviction in 2007 and ordered a de novo trial on the grounds that the appellant lacked adequate representation. The complainant, a nine-year-old girl, alleged that the appellant gagged and raped her. On appeal, the appellant contended that the testimony of the victim should be excluded from evidence because the testimony was conducted in camera. The victim testified in a closed room that allowed cross-examination by the defendant and visual access for jurors. The court held that the victim’s testimony was admissible, stating that if “a potential child victim witness would suffer ‘serious emotional distress’ and might just not be able to communicate within a reasonable fear free environment if put on the stand in the presence of the accused abuser to introduce courtroom testimony” then an in camera witness presentation is appropriate. The appellant's constitutional right to confront his accuser was preserved because he was afforded opportunity to listen to testimony and cross-examine the witness. In addition, the court referenced U.S. law on in camera testimony, citing U.S. Supreme Court cases to support its decision. The court stated: “It is the rule of general application in our jurisdiction that unless expressly contrary by the laws in vogue, common law and usages of the courts of England and of the United States, other authoritative treaties, principles and rules set forth in case law and in Blackstone and Kent Commentaries, when applicable, are deemed as Liberian Laws.” Finally, the Court held that medical testimony establishing rape, the testimony of the complainant, the appellant's admission that the complainant spent the nights in question with him, and unchallenged testimony claiming that the appellant had offered the complainant's family money in exchange for keeping the rape a secret were more than a sufficient "mountain of evidence" to sustain the conviction. It is not necessary, the Court stated, for the prosecution to produce an eye witness, "direct proof", or evidence eliminating every single possible alternative in order to meet their burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

Nimely v. Paye, et al. Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2011 )

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant was guilty of rape. The complainant alleged that the appellant had sex with her when she was 13 years old and he was 18 years old. She alleged that the appellant invited her to his room, gagged her, and had sexual intercourse with her. Her brother’s wife forced open the door after the complainant failed to answer her phone call. The complainant's brother then called the police. The appellant admitted to police that he and the complainant had sex. The court found the appellant guilty of rape because the elements of Liberian statutory rape law are (1) sexual intercourse, (2) the perpetrator is at least 18 years of age, and (3) the victim is less than 18 years of age. However, the court reversed his conviction because the trial court relied on inaccurate information in determining the appellant’s age. The appellant testified that he was 17 years old at the time of the rape. Documents such as a passport or birth certificate were unavailable. The court held that in the absence of any rebuttal evidence by the prosecution, the court must accept that the appellant was 17 years old and therefore a juvenile when he had sex with the complainant. Under Liberian law, a juvenile cannot commit a crime, but is instead considered a juvenile delinquent. If a case involves a juvenile delinquent who is over 16 years of age and is accused of conduct that would constitute a felony carrying a sentence of life imprisonment or death if committed by an adult of at least 18 years of age, then the circuit court must consider the best interests of the Republic and the juvenile to determine whether to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter and preside over the case or choose to refer it to the juvenile court. However, the circuit court did not make this determination. Rather, it proceeded with the trial as though the the appellant was an adult and sentenced him to life imprisonment as an adult. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed his conviction and remanded him to the custody of his parents until the age of 21.

Rogers v. Republic of Liberia Supreme Court of Liberia ( 2009 )

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s judgment that appellant, Allen Rogers, was guilty of rape. The 11-year-old complainant alleged that the appellant kidnapped her and a boy for two months, raping her daily during this time period. She testified that the appellant threatened to kill her if she talked about the rape. In his defense, the appellant testified that the week before the alleged kidnapping occurred, he knelt down to pray and heard the voice of someone he called Evee. Evee told him “your two children have come.” He then met the complainant and the other child. He took them to the town advisor, who said that the appellant could keep them at his house. The appellant was found guilty of statutory rape and given the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. The court reversed the conviction because the appellant did not receive adequate representation. His representation was inadequate because the public defender assigned to his case failed to call corroborating witnesses and counsel “knew, or ought to have known that the lone testimony of the appellant was not sufficient to establish his innocence. Thus, his failure to have ensured that other witness[es] appear to testify for the appellant was a serious dereliction of duty.” In Liberia, “the uncorroborated testimony of the accused person is not sufficient to rebut proof of guilt.” Therefore the court reversed the appellant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.

On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgment that appellants, Living Counsellor, Wisdom Counsellor, and Righteous Counsellor, were guilty of rape. Their four female victims ranged from ages 7 to 12. The victims were introduced into the Kingdom Assembly Church of Africa, or the “Never Die Church,” so named because it promised followers eternal life on earth. It also promoted free sexual relations among its members. The victims testified that they were beaten and raped by members of the church. The court stated that “the evidence adduced during the trial show that rape is institutionalized in the Never Die Church. The testimonies given by the prosecution witnesses also points to a situation where the victims were living in a condition of servitude almost identical to slavery.” The appellants argued that “they did not rape the girls but that they only share love with their sisters because they have no earthly mother or father but only Wonderful Counsellor.” They argued that their conviction should be overturned because they were also charged with gang rape, but the trial judge failed to instruct the jury on that charge. Still, their conviction was upheld because they were convicted of rape nonetheless.

Cole, et al. v. Dixon Supreme Court of Liberia ( 1938 )

This case established that a wife’s dower is not an asset of her husband’s estate. After Mr. Dixon died intestate, his widow claimed that she held title to real property that had been conveyed to her as a deed of gift from her husband. The executor, appointed by the county, argued that the property was an asset of the estate because the right of dower accrues only after the death of the husband. The court disagreed, holding that “[the] inchoate right of dower is so vested in the wife as against the husband immediately on the marriage that no conveyance or act of the husband can deprive her of it,” including any creditors’ claims against the husband.

Williams v. Wynn Supreme Court of Liberia ( 1914 )

This case established a precedent for property rights of a widow when her husband dies intestate. On appeal, the Supreme Court excluded from probate ten acres of land to which Ms. Williams claimed title. Ms. Williams’ husband died intestate and the executor of his estate, appointed by the Probate Court, included all real and personal property from the marriage in determining the assets of the estate. Ms. Williams claimed that she held title to ten acres of property that her husband had purchased through a third party, with title vesting in the wife. The executor argued, and the trial court held, that all property acquired through the husband could be made liable for his debts. The trial court relied upon the Constitution of Liberia, which states “The property of which a woman may be possessed at the time of her marriage and also that of which she may afterwards become possessed, otherwise than by her husband shall not be held responsible for his debts.” The court reasoned that this clause implies that property acquired through her husband could be held liable for his debts. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that if a husband acquires property in the name of a third party, who becomes the medium through which title vests in the wife, the wife has an absolute right in that property and is not liable for the claims of the husband’s creditors. The court failed to apply this holding to personal property of the marriage, however, stating that instead personal property procured and owned by the deceased for the common use of the household is an asset of the estate.